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Without going over the history of the literature in regional dynamics (Haynes et al, 1997), 
we know that there has been a recent growth in studies of international and interregional 
convergence using aggregate economic indices.  This literature often examines the relationship 
between new technology and economic growth (Solow, 1956; Porter, 1990; Enos, 1992; Hobday, 
1995; Anderson, 1996; Rigby, 2000; Amsden and Chu, 2002).  Much of that analysis indicates 
that chronological ‘lateness’ in the industrialization process does not relegate lagging regions 
permanently to their disadvantaged position.  Positive changes due to increases in efficiency, 
rapid technological change, technological diffusion and spillovers, access to new markets and 
differential costs of factor inputs may all play a role in the reduction or elimination of gaps in 
competitive capacity, creating the possibilities for economic catch-up.  Sharif (1989) recognized 
these ‘late-industrializers’ as latecomers in the context of technological innovation and diffusion.  
He noted that beneficial learning investments on the part of newcomers and the encumbrances of 
earlier investments on the part of mature industrializers might play compensating roles leading to 
different forms of convergence.  Others have noted late adoption generates advantage in the 
incorporation of new technology and may result in accelerated diffusion among lagging regions 
creating newer opportunities for latecomers (Gerschenkron, 1962; Abromevitz, 1986; Perkins 
and Neumayer, 2005). 
Other explanatory factors of empirically successful latecomer strategies include the 
degree of openness to international trade and investment and the level of integration into the 
globalization process (Storper, 1997; OECD, 1998; Rigby, 2000; Lall, 2002).  Perkins and 
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Neumayer (2005) argue the importance of the neoclassical school’s emphasis on the role of 
market liberalization among developing countries including the removal of institutional barriers, 
the positive environment for foreign investment and the internationalization of trade which both 
stimulate and accelerate technological diffusion and internal innovation. 
Some of the literature on the emergence of the Asia economies – the so called ‘little 
tigers’ – embodies this catch-up process of latecomer economies, particularly in manufacturing 
where many of these economies have reduced or eliminated the gap in production related 
capabilities and in other cases have surpassed their advanced economy counterparts (Kim, 1980 
and 1997; Ernst and O’Connor, 1992; Hobday, 1995 and 2001; Lall, 2000; Mathews and Cho, 
2000; Mathews, 2002; Liu, 2005).  In many cases technological innovation has played a central 
role in this catch up process in these latecomer regions (Ernst, 2004).  Specifically, innovation in 
electronics manufacturing is often cited in that literature and is based on advantageous 
production capacity, efficiency from low cost production, rapid model changes to fit changing 
customer needs and tastes, available investment for technological change and refitting and 
skilled engineering adaptation in production processes and in final product design (Ernst, 2004; 
UNIDO, 2002; David, 2002). 
The central idea is that international knowledge diffusion from leading regions to lagging 
regions can be expressed as a latecomer innovation strategy with respect to new innovations in 
process technologies, critical component development or in rapid changes in final product 
design.  This is the basis of Solow’s (1956) neoclassical growth school where free technological 
spillovers produce long-run economic convergence.  Theories in the regional economic 
development literature, such as growth pole theory or trickle down effects, can also be seen as 
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expressions of these spillovers (Darwent, 1969; Hermason, 1972; Higgins and Savoie, 1995; 
Stimson et al, 2002).  When intermediate development steps are shortened or eliminated these 
policies are often referred to as ‘leapfrog’ strategies – typical of some successful Asian 
economies (Singh, 1999). 
Freeman (1987) and Nelson (1993) analyze the role of technological diffusion from a 
different perspective and conclude that rather than a simple flow of knowledge across country 
borders, technological advance and innovation relies on specific firms, networks, and economic 
institutions.  They note the successful economic stories of the US in the 19
th century, Japan in the 
1960s, Korea and Singapore and other Asian economies in the 1980s, and more recently China, 
who all benefited from the exploitation of opportunities for technology catch-up (Liu, 2005).  To 
some extent this view integrates the role of government into the technological innovation 
process, although most studies of Asian countries isolate the two processes of government and 
free market decision making (Amsden, 1989; World Bank, 1993). 
Another perspective based on technological learning and the role of national innovation 
systems also is discussed (Bell and Pavitt, 1997;  Kim, 1997; Lee and Lim, 2001).  Lee and Lim 
(2001) observe that different technological regimes have different patterns of innovation and 
diffusion across industries and regions or even countries.  However, it is important to remember 
that latecomer firms or sectors are not ensured of catch up performance with advanced 
economies even when following similar strategies because the contextual economic environment 
is always changing.  So what worked in one environmental situation may not be effective in 
another. 
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This paper explores the closing of the gap in competitive capacity by decomposing the 
aggregate process and looking at one sector – telecommunications – in one developing economy 
– China.   
II. INTRODUCTION 
China has the world’s largest population.  More than 60% live in the countryside.  In 
2003 approximately 20% of the population had fixed line telephone access; approximately 21% 
had cell phones.  Less than 10% of the mobile phone subscribers live in the countryside.  (MII, 
2004). 
Telecommunications development in China was highly rigid and a low priority for thirty 
years (1949-1979).  A series of reforms followed during the next twelve years and mobile phone 
communications were introduced into China in 1987.  The mid-to late 1990s saw rapid 
development, competition and explosive growth (Figure 1).   Mobile phone communications 
grew at an astounding rate, reaching 10 million users by 1997.  The number of mobile 
subscribers exceeded fixed-line users seven years later.  Since 2000 there has been full 
competition in value added services and new technologies have been introduced (Network 
Weekly, 2004).   
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With a population of over 1.3 billion, China has the largest handset market in the world 
and this market continues to grow at a rapid rate.  At the end of 2003 there were an estimated 
268 million mobile subscribers, and more than 5 million people signed up for cellular phones 
each month (MII, 2004).  Before 1999 China’s mobile handset market had been completely 
dominated by foreign brand products, such as Motorola, Nokia, and Ericsson. As China applied 
its “Attracting and Absorbing Foreign Direct Investment” policies towards foreign mobile 
communications equipment providers, almost all major handset manufacturers were encouraged 
to establish joint ventures in China.  As a result, all mobile phones sold in China were produced 
by foreign-owned enterprises or imported directly from abroad before 1998.  Lacking scientific 
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knowledge in local settings, with poorly developed or nonexistent support industries, with a 
history of heavily regulated telephony, with a poorly developed hard wire telephony 
infrastructure and with a negative view about the contribution of communications to 
productivity, China constrained indigenous firms from moving first in China’s domestic market.  
However, since the entry of Chinese domestic mobile handset manufacturers in 1998, 
foreign brand products gradually lost their dominance in the handset market in China.  In 2002, 
Chinese brands captured about 30% of the market, growing to approximately 55% in 2003.  
Chinese domestic suppliers have successfully established their position to surpass the market 
share of joint ventures while direct imports largely have been phased out. Chinese brands are 
becoming the mainstream products in China’s domestic mobile phone market. 
How did China’s domestic firms catch up with the early movers, overcome inherent 
disadvantages and succeed in dominating the world’s largest handset market in less than five 
years?  By examining the mobile communications sector as a whole and through case examples, 
this paper examines how China’s domestic firms have surmounted their inherent disadvantages 
and have taken a leadership position in limited product areas.  This paper concludes with a 
summary of factors that contributed to the success of China’s domestic handset manufacturers.   
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S MOBILE HANDSET MANUFACTURING SECTOR 
The mobile communications market in China relied totally on direct imports in the late 
1980s.  During China's transition from a planned economy to a more market oriented economy, 
telecommunications became a leading sector with an exponential growth rate in a dualistic 
economy (Jin and Haynes, 1997).  Realizing the attractiveness of its potential market demand for 
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mobile communications equipment and the bargaining power generated from its market size, 
China actively approached foreign suppliers with joint venture negotiations and technology 
transfer opportunities.  With the establishment of Shanghai Bell in 1984, joint ventures in 
selected areas were highly encouraged.  Table 1 shows the digital cellular sector listed in the 
“encouraged” category in the “Government Guideline for Foreign Investment in 
Telecommunications” issued by the State Council in 1995.  In contrast, analogue wireless system 
is listed as “restricted” while the telecommunications service sector is completely prohibited 
from foreign investment.  Overall, foreign investment in the mobile communications equipment 
manufacturing sector was highly encouraged by the Chinese government in the mid-1990s.  
Table 1. Regulatory Categories of FDI in the Telecom Sector (1995) 
Category  Details 
Encouraged  Digital cellular, SDH, ATM switching system, satellite communications system, digital 
microwave system 
Restricted  Analogue wireless system, PABX, non-ATM central office switches, TV and Radio 
Broadcasting systems, Fax machines, low speed digital microwave system 
Forbidden  Telecommunications basic service 
Source: Lu & Wong (2003) 
When the “Attracting and Absorbing Foreign Direct Investment” policy as applied to the 
mobile communications equipment manufacturing sector it led to the emergence of foreign direct 
investment in mobile handset production in the early 1990s.  In 1992, Motorola built its first 
manufacturing plant in the port of Tianjin.  Now nearly all the world famous mobile 
communications equipment providers, including Motorola, Ericsson, Nokia, Siemens, and 
Samsung, have established joint venture companies in China.  Motorola, Nokia and Ericsson are 
the three largest. The total foreign investment in this sector was $1.9 billion in 1998 and over $4 
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billion in 2001 (Wang, 2003).  Table 2 shows Motorola alone had invested $3.4 billion in China 
through 2002 (ChinaNex, 2004). 
Table 2. Primary Foreign Handset Producers in China 
  Motorola  Nokia  Ericsson  Siemens  Samsung 




1992 Middle  1990s  1992  1993  -- 
Subsidiaries 
in China 
WO (1); JV (8); 
controlled (1); local 
offices  (26); R&D 
facilities (18); 
employees (13,000) 






WO (4); JV 
(10); local 












(1); local offices (3); 
R&D center (1); after-




$3.4 billion (till 
2002); R&D, $0.3 
billion 
More than $2.9 
billion 





More than $2.6 billion 
Revenue 





-- --  --  12.5 million 
(2003)  -- 
Mobile 
phones sold in 
China (2003) 
about 12 million   about 10 million  --  2-3 million   -- 
Market share 
(1999)  39.4% 32.3%  6.44%  5.95%  -- 
Market share 
(2002)  25.76% 18.17%  2.09%  4.66%  -- 
Notes: WO: wholly owned; JV: joint venture; --: not available. 
Source: Individual company’s official website and ChinaNex website at: 
http://www.chinanex.com/company/index.htm
 
These foreign companies enjoyed a long period of success due to strong demand in China.  
Four primary joint venture firms, Motorola, Ericsson, Nokia, and Siemens, dominated China’s 
mobile handset market before 2002.  The aggregate market share of these four companies was 
over 85% in 1999.  China is also the single largest market for many large multinational 
companies.  China accounts for 30% of Motorola’s handset sales, making Motorola increasingly 
dependent on China for growth.  Ericsson has established a primary base for production for 
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worldwide  sales in China and transferred R&D and production research to China, making it a 
regional presence.  Nokia’s largest market is China, with revenue of over $2.5 million and 
exports valued at $2.1 billion for 2003.  Siemens’ early, but smaller, commitment continued to 
pay dividends while Samsung, although late, was investing heavily (ChinaNex, 2004). 
Local  producers have captured more than 50% of China’s domestic market, but joint 
ventures in China are still their primary production bases to supply the global market.  In 2001, 
the total number of mobile handsets exported from China was 39.63 million, increasing to 63.15 
million in 2002 and 95.23 million in 2003 (Ministry of Commerce, 2004).  More than 98% of 
these exported handsets were manufactured by those joint ventures (MII, 2004).  Although these 
foreign companies have lost their dominating role in China’s domestic market, they are 
producing more handsets than China’s domestic firms (about 70% of total production in 2003) 
increasingly for export.  However, as of 2004 foreign companies through joint ventures still 
dominate the domestic high-end handset market (with a price greater than 3000 RMB/$400 per 
handset). 

















1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Source: Ministry of Information Industry (various years) 
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Local firms started supplying China’s domestic handset market in 1998 when Kejian 
manufactured the first GSM handset with a domestic brand.  However, the development of the 
local manufacturers had been very slow prior to 2002.  A few large international companies 
dominated China’s internal market, especially in the urban areas.  The market share of domestic 
brands in China’s domestic market was only 5% in 1999 and 10.7% in 2000.   
Chinese domestic companies lagged in all technological areas of handset manufacturing 
and design.  The Chinese government began to support domestic producers officially after 1999.  
In January 1999, “Several Issues on Speeding up the Development of Chinese Mobile 
Communications Industry” was issued by the State Council (Tan, 2002).  This document 
stipulated a list of measures to support local mobile communications equipment providers, 
including assignment of research grants for R&D, preferred interest rates, discounted tax rates, 
restriction of further foreign investment in the handset manufacturing sector, and other indirect 
measures, such as local governments’ provision of free land in high-tech industrial parks for 
handset producers. 
Table 3. China’s Domestic Handset Manufacturers (2003) 
Categories  Firms (date of first mobile phone manufactured) 
Consumer electronics 
producers 
TCL (2000), Haier (1999), Konka (2000), Xiaxin (1998), Hisense 
(2001)  
Specialized mobile phone 
producers 




Datang(2001), Zhongxin(2000), Panda (1998), Panda  Mobile (1998)
PC manufacturers  Legend (2002), Tide (2001) 
Source: summarized by the authors 
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Encouraged by government’s support and lured by the rapidly growing handset market in 
China, many domestic firms entered this market after 1999.  There are over twenty domestic 
GSM or CDMA handset manufacturers now, which grew out of existing manufacturers in the 
four categories as listed in Table 3: consumer electronics producers, specialized mobile phone 
producers, telecommunications equipment manufacturers, and PC manufactures.  Mastering 
manufacturing skills and occupying the domestic market was a first priority for these domestic 
producers.  In fact, most domestic firms chose a “brand-pasting” (Tie Pai) strategy, that is, they 
imported mobile phones directly from South Korea or Taiwan and then pasted their own brands 
on the phones.  In this sense, most of the first generation handsets of these firms are not “real” 
domestic brand products since they were not designed and manufactured domestically.  But at 
the same time, they invested heavily in manufacturing facilities and process technologies to 
achieve economies of scale and learning curve effects.  Later, most of these firms chose joint 
cooperation with foreign companies (not joint ventures) or developed R&D independently.  
Some of the domestic manufacturers are still using the “brand-pasting” method for at least a 
portion of their products and enjoy the benefits of the government’s preferential policies.  For 
example, as late as in 2003, a senior official of Ministry of Information Industry (MII) 
condemned publicly the “brand-pasting” strategy and threatened to ban the import of mobile 
phones completely in 2004 (Wang, 2004).  Some analysts are skeptical about the technical 
competency of China’s domestic firms (Ministry of Commerce, 2003), but clearly the capacity 
gap is closing.   
China’s local producers gradually dominated the domestic mobile phone market.  Figure 
3 shows that the domestic market share of Chinese local manufacturers increased gradually from 
5.46% in 1999 to 10.7% in 2000, and 21.8% in 2001.  In 2002 the market share increased sharply 
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to 39.4%.  In 2003, China’s domestic firms produced 34.3 million and sold 34.1 million mobile 
handsets, taking a majority of China’s mobile handset market with a share of 55.8% (MII, 2004).  
In contrast, the share of the four leading foreign-brands, Motorola, Nokia, Siemens, and Ericsson, 
declined from more than 85% in 1999 to 46% in 2002, and  24% in 2003 (MII, 2004).  Bird has 
been a leading producer with the largest market share of all domestic firms since 2000.  
According to MII (2004), Bird held 15% of handset market in 2003, and is a major contributor to 
lifting the share of Chinese brands to 55.8% in 2003.  Overall, ten domestic firms produced more 
than one million handsets in 2003.  






















Source: MII (various years) 
 
Chinese handset makers have successfully narrowed the technology gap with industry 
leaders by aggressive investment in manufacturing facilities.  After 2002, Chinese handset 
manufacturers also significantly increased investment in R&D, focusing on upgrading their 
technological capabilities.  Bird spent 6% of its revenue on R&D in 2003 (Network Weekly, 
2004).  But Chinese makers had not yet reached the stage of mastering the core technologies of 
handset products.  In fact, by the close of 2004 no domestic firm in China has grasped the core 
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technology of GSM and CDMA mobile phones.  This is true also for many Japanese and South 
Korean companies (as of 2004) since core technologies of chip design were controlled by Texas 
Instruments (TI), Qualcomm and a few other companies. 
Overall, there is a dynamic balance between Chinese domestic firms and foreign owned 
enterprises in the handset market.  China’s policy has successfully empowered local firms to 
dominate the low-end and some medium-end Chinese markets with the help of foreign-owned 
and joint venture enterprises.  On the other hand, foreign owned enterprises have continued to 
successfully dominate the high-end and some medium-end markets in China through joint 
ventures and intermediate goods export.  China’s domestic firms have occupied a large market 
share but have a long way to go to achieve technological leadership. 
IV. BEHIND THE HYPER GROWTH 
Chinese domestic mobile phone manufacturers are “latecomers” since they entered the 
handset market about ten years later than the foreign producers.  In this sense, the mobile phone 
manufacturing industry in China provides a good test case of the catch-up process by firms who 
are “latecomers”.  The word “latecomer” has been used extensively in previous economic and 
organizational studies.  For example, the Korean semiconductor industry has been widely cited 
as an example of the successful latecomers (Cho, et al, 1998; Mathews and Cho, 1999; Hobday, 
1995; Choung et al, 2000).  Cho et al (1998) classified the sources of early mover advantages, as 
well as latecomer advantages, into three areas: market, competition, and the characteristics of the 
early moving firm (see Table 4).  
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Many factors contributed to the rapid development of China’s mobile phone 
manufacturing.  Following a similar framework as summarized by Cho et al (1998), we classified 
success factors and examined the mobile communications sector as a whole.  Here we combine 
those factors listed as “competition” and “firm” in Table 4 into a broad competition category 
while emphasizing another important factor – government policies. 
Table 4. Summary of early-movers/latecomers’ advantages 
  Advantages of early movers  Opportunities for latecomers 
Market  Brand loyalty; switching 
costs;  
Dynamic market; customer taste adjustments; new 
technological changes; 
Competition  Preemption Incumbent  inertia 
Firm itself  Advantage through learning 
by doing 
More concrete info and less uncertainty; often 
resource-rich environment  
Source: Based on Cho et al (1998) 
Market 
Local market conditions in China supported an immediate demand for mobile phones 
when local producers entered the market in late 1998.  Before the late 1990s, owning a mobile 
phone was a rare luxury reserved only for leading bureaucrats or wealthy businessmen.  But 
since 1998, ordinary persons have gradually accepted mobile phones because of the sharp 
decline in the mobile connection fees and mobile phone prices.  In 1999, the total number of 
mobile phone users reached 43.3 million and nearly doubled in one year, reaching 84.5 million at 
the end of 2000.  The number of China’s mobile phone users increases at least 50 million every 
year.  The increase of the user base creates a large handset market in China (Figure 4).  Since 
2002 China has had the largest telecommunications network in terms of both fixed and mobile 
communications capacities.  There were over 268 million mobile phone subscribers and 264 
million fixed-line telephone users in China by the end of 2003.  Even a small share of this large 
market would support the growth of a large producer.   
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (various years); MII website, http://www.mii.gov.cn/mii/hyzw/tjxx.html
More important, the inherent nature of the mobile phone business was such that it created 
opportunities for latecomers to technologically leapfrog over early starters and assume industry 
leadership in certain fields.  China’s 2G (second generation) mobile phone domestic producers 
could compete with foreign rivals at the chip-designing level because of technological patents.  
But many companies without chip technology, such as Samsung and LG, also established their 
position by succeeding in developing new application software and exterior designs.  China’s 
domestic producers also mastered design capability quickly.  Now, China’s domestic firms 
provide more new GSM handset models than their foreign competitors.  Bird claims two-thirds 
of its handsets are designed in-house.  It launched 35 new models in 2003 and another 50 were 
scheduled for 2004.  In contrast, Nokia launched only 14 GSM models in China in 2003.  
Nokia's market share has declined steadily in China from 30% in 2000 to 13% in 2003, due 
partly to insipid flat design and lack of innovation (Sun, 2003).  
Due to technological change China’s firms are at the same starting point with foreign 
competitors for 3G mobile phone technologies.  It is not impossible for China’s domestic firms 
to become involved and then control core technologies in some areas for 3G.  In fact, China had 
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paid special attention to the TD-SCDMA standard and has jointly developed it with the China 
Academy of Telecommunications Technology (CATT) and Siemens.  TD-SCDMA is one of the 
only three international standards recognized by the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) for 3G and is the first ITU standard proposed by China.  On Oct 30, 2002, the alliance of 
TD-SCDMA industry, consisting of eight domestic enterprises including Datang , Huawei, 
Soutec, Huali, Legend, ZTE,CEC and Putian, was established in Beijing.  Financially supported 
by the Chinese government, a meeting on TD-SCDMA prototype standards was provided by 
members of the Alliance in 2004 (RTX Telecom, 2003).  Although Motorola, Nokia, and 
Ericsson already have their own mature 3G products, these products cannot easily be introduced 
into China because of different standards.  China’s domestic firms have the potential of building 
technological competency in this area.  
Competition 
In the intensely competitive handset market, domestic manufacturers compete directly 
with foreign owned or joint venture rivals.  China’s diverse domestic mobile phone 
manufacturers have adopted a series of strategies to compete with their leading foreign 
competitors.  This competition has contributed to China’s success.  As in many other Chinese 
industries, domestic competition among China’s mobile handset manufacturers has been 
regarded as more important and threatening than competition overseas.  
First, China’s domestic firms focused on the low or middle-end market and initiated 
severe price competition based on their advantages in low costs and local market characteristics.  
The leading domestic firm, Bird, engages in competition by keeping prices lower than 
comparable products (ChinaNex, 2004).  Network Weekly (2004) estimates the average price of 
the mobile phones sold by Bird to be about RMB 919.21 (about $110) with an average profit of 
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RMB 20.84 (less than $3) per handset, indicating that most mobile phones sold by Bird were 
low-end products.  Joint ventures eventually lost the low-end market because of their relatively 
higher costs in labor and distribution.  Even in the midrange segments, joint ventures are facing 
strong competition – mainly from Chinese companies. 
Second, local manufacturers usually have more extensive distribution channels which 
assist the capture and maintenance of their market throughout the country, especially in small 
cities and in the countryside.  More than twenty handset manufacturers in China (including Bird, 
Kejian, TCL Mobile, and other small and medium-sized companies) primarily sell handsets 
through their own retail stores or dealers throughout the country.  In recent years, some 
manufacturers also began to supply handsets to the mobile communications carriers.  Figure 5 
shows the distribution channels of a typical mobile handset manufacturer in China.  Many 
specialized handset producers built their distribution channels on their own while electronic 
goods producers or PC manufacturers used their existing distribution networks.  Manufacturers 
usually give the dealers a commission for each handset sold by the dealers.  The commission 
rates vary in accordance with the number of handsets sold in a certain period of time.  Some 
dealers offer incentives, reducing their commissions in an attempt to attract more customers and 
to obtain higher rates of commission later.  Joint ventures usually do not have their own sales 
networks, but depend on a complicated three-level hierarchical agency system, which increases 
their distribution costs.  As a result, domestic firms usually have more distribution channels than 
their foreign competitors.  Nokia sells its handsets through a reseller network with 900 outlets in 
China and has begun to work with regional distributors such as electronics store chains.  In 
contrast, Bird sells its products through 40 distributors, 400 sales offices, 15,000 resellers and 
50,000 retail outlets (ChinaNex, 2004).   
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Figure 5. Distribution channels of domestic firms 
 
Source: summarized by the authors 
 
Chinese producers also often provide better quality after-sale services.  Since many of 
these mobile phone manufacturers are also consumer-electric producers, they have experience 
and expertise in after-sale service.  Bird built nearly 2,000 customers support centers, many in 
second and third-tier cities.  
Government Support 
Last and most important is the Chinese government’s carefully planned intervention and 
support for the handset manufacturing sector.  In the early stages, the Chinese government 
maintained policies promoting foreign investment in this industry.  Diverse forms were adopted, 
including foreign wholly owned enterprises, joint venture enterprises, joint cooperation 
enterprises and so on.  The presence of many joint venture handset manufacturers in China 
fostered the diffusion of technology expertise across the country.  This was a broad-ranging 
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knowledge diffusion and exchange which involved R&D, production, sub-contracting, marketing, 
after-sales services, and local human resource training.  China’s domestic entrepreneurs, 
designers, workers, and engineers quickly grasped the opportunity to develop competitive local 
products.  Since a local company, Kejian, produced the first GSM handset in 1998, local 
manufacturers’ production of handsets gained rapid growth built on the diffusion of technologies 
into China through various foreign investment and technology transfers and augmented them by 
local R&D efforts.  
China’s ultimate goal is to enable its local firms to compete with multinational companies, 
both in the Chinese market and in the global market.  The Chinese government shifted its role 
from supporter of joint ventures in the mobile communications manufacturing industry, 
including the handset sector, to a role of protector when domestic firms began to compete with 
those foreign investment controlled firms.  The State Council adopted policies designed to allow 
Chinese firms to increase technological capacity and occupy the domestic market, to attract more 
investment and to collect special program funds to improve the technological competency of 
domestic mobile communications equipment producers (Network Weekly, 2004).  The State 
Council financially supported R&D for mobile technologies by (1) transferring 5% of fixed-line 
telephone installation fees as a special grant from 1999 to 2003 and (2) the MII invested 1.4 
billion Yuan ($169.7 million) from mobile connection fees.  In addition, it stopped issuing 
licenses for joint ventures in mobile handset manufacturing after 1999.     
Further, when GSM handset technology was becoming obsolete and CDMA technologies 
were maturing, the government established preferential policies toward domestic CDMA 
manufacturers. These policies limited domestic licenses for foreign competitors, restricted the 
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sales of CDMA handsets produced by joint venture firms and required domestic branding and 
R&D development.  In 2001 licenses for CDMA mobile phone production were issued to 18 
domestic firms and Motorola; Nokia received a license in 2003; no more licenses will be issued.  
The government restricts importation of CDMA handsets with quotas and charges an extra 2.5 to 
5% of total sale volume if joint venture firms sell CDMA handsets in China.  The government 
required domestic CDMA mobile handset manufacturers to own their own brands, have 
independent R&D capability and/or possess appropriate patents. 
In summary, tariff reduction, preferred interest rates, subsidies for R&D, regulations of 
market entry, and many other measures were implemented in China to support its mobile handset 
manufacturing sector.  Telecommunications service providers also are encouraged by the 
government to purchase products of domestic venders.  An extreme example is that the Chinese 
government organized supply-demand coordination conferences to promote the adoption of 
domestic products (Lu and Wong, 2003).  In addition, numerical targets for export, production 
and R&D have been suggested by the government (MII, 2004).  The government has been an 
important factor in the development of China’s handset manufacturing sector and closing the 
technology capacity gap.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
China is the largest handset market in the world and this market continues to grow at an 
extremely rapid rate.  Before 1999 China’s mobile handset market was completely dominated by 
foreign brands products.  However, since the entry of Chinese domestic mobile handset 
manufacturers in 1998, the domestic suppliers have gradually established their position to 
surpass the market share of joint ventures while direct imports have been largely phased out.  
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While products of joint ventures still control the high-end market, Chinese domestic brands are 
becoming the mainstream products in China’s mobile handset market. 
By examining China’s mobile handset manufacturing sector as a whole and through case 
examples, we found several factors that contributed to the success of China’s domestic handset 
manufacturers.  Following a framework summarized by Cho et al (1998), we classify these 
factors into three categories.  First, China’s large handset market supported an immediate 
demand for mobile phones.  The inherent nature of the mobile phone business was such that it 
created opportunities for latecomers to technologically leapfrog.  Second, in the intense 
competition with joint ventures, China’s domestic producers occupied the domestic market with 
the advantages of low prices, extensive distribution channels, high performance-price ratios, 
better after-sale service, as well as a better understanding of the local market and tastes.  Last, 
China growth of the industry has been carefully planned with intervention through government 
policies.  By playing various roles in a timely manner, the Chinese government has provided 
crucial support for development of the mobile handset industry.  
The case of China’s mobile handset market suggests China has localized the production 
of low-to-medium-end handset products, which gradually destroyed the direct import of these 
products and occupied the market which had been dominated by joint ventures.  New and high-
end handset products are primarily developed and manufactured by joint ventures or imported 
directly from overseas.  These high-end products would downgrade to medium-end or low-end 
ones over a short period of time.  However, by actively investing in R&D and participating in the 
establishment of new technology standards, it is possible that China’s local producers will build 
their technological competencies and become technological leaders in certain areas.  
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